Each month, we take a deeper dive into one defining political issue shaping football beyond the pitch — and why it matters to the game at large.
- January -
Saudi Arabia’s PIF as a Football Owner:
When a Sovereign Wealth Fund Owns the Game
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund is no longer a background investor in football; it has become a central actor shaping clubs, leagues, competitions, and, crucially, a potential instrument for reshaping the Kingdom’s heavily criticized image on the global stage.​ Although the country's long-standing reliance on oil exports to power its economy has been historically significant for many decades, it is anticipated that in the upcoming years, countries' reliance on oil would decrease and be progressively replaced by a post-carbon order. As a result, the backbone of Mohammad bin Salman's 2030 Vision is a 700-billion-dollar sovereign wealth fund known as PIF, which has rapidly started making investments in various sectors, such as renewables, media, tech, transport, real estate, but remarkably in sports, notably football, and is starting to take the lead in the football investment market. Its football portfolio is anything but boring; in fact, given its magnitude, it could be described as dizzying. We arrive at an astounding estimate of 10–15 billion dollars in football-related assets solely since 2018 when we account for the PIF's direct investments (ownership and equity in clubs), player transfers, tournaments, and sponsorships.
But a further question should be asked, given Saudi Arabia’s record of contentious conduct, the question of why such large investments are made arises. Due to suspicions of sports-washing, Saudi Arabia's reasons for making such investments and holding such sporting occasions are being questioned, because trying to balance a country's conservative norms with the growth of western-style entertainment and culture in the same place is not something that happens for no reason and vision. Examples of these issues include Saudi's strict sharia law restricting women's rights, the assassination of a Saudi journalist because of its critics about the country, the interrogations about modern slavery in the construction sector, and many more.
From Club Purchase to State Instrument​
​When Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund completed the £300 million takeover of Newcastle United in October 2021, it represented more than just a shift in ownership; it was a structural and political turning moment in global football governance. At first glance, the deal appeared to be similar to previous foreign takeovers, but it quickly became clear that something was off. Private owners have long been known to buy stakes in clubs, but unlike most foreign owners, PIF is a state-owned sovereign wealth fund. This attracted attention outside Newcastle, as issues were raised about the unclear line between team ownership and state power. Football supporters are concerned about Saudi Arabia's crown prince, Mohamed Bin Salman, and his role, particularly given the country's track record on human rights.
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​​​​Many people believe that this acquisition was used to advance the country's agenda, as a soft power and sportswashing instrument, with the goal of restoring the country's battered image. The Newcastle takeover is not an isolated move but part of a wider pattern of Saudi-backed investments, with PIF steadily building stakes across global industries as part of a long-term strategic approach.​ Disney, Uber, Facebook, and Starbucks are just a few of the companies that have received hundreds of millions of pounds from PIF. However, the Newscastle takeover provoked far more public response since football ownership imposes more visible influence over a community-embedded institution, and football, in general, being the most watched sports in the world.
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The takeover also sparked strong reactions from non-governmental organisations, particularly human rights groups, many of which described the deal as an example of sportswashing. Amnesty International UK was among the most outspoken critics. After the takeover was confirmed, its chief executive, Sacha Deshmukh, said the deal was “a clear attempt by the Saudi government to use the glamour of top-level football to improve its poor human rights record.” Amnesty also pointed to weaknesses in the Premier League’s Owners’ and Directors’ Test, the process used to decide whether a potential owner is legally fit to run a club. The organisation noted that the test does not mention human rights, despite English football claiming to follow FIFA standards, and has proposed a revised test that would include human rights criteria.​ The league approved the £300 million takeover after receiving legally binding assurances that the Saudi state would not control Newcastle United. Critics, however, argue that this claim is difficult to separate from the fact that the Public Investment Fund is chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi, who has been linked by international organisations to serious human rights concerns, including the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.
Investment as Strategy: PIF and Vision 2030
​Established as Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund operates as a state-affiliated investment vehicle with ambitions extending beyond pure financial return. Founded in 1971 and now managing close to one trillion dollars in assets, it ranks among the world’s largest sovereign investors. Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Salman, PIF has shifted from a largely domestic, passive holding fund into an increasingly assertive global investor, positioned at the center of Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation and long-term development strategy. As of today, the sovereign investment fund has focused its economic activities on four pillars, all focused on fulfilling Saudi’s Vision 2030. Its activities now focus on domestic mega-projects (tourism, culture, infrastructure), national champions (scaling Saudi firms), strategic overseas stakes (technology and global reach), and a diversified portfolio (financial stability beyond oil).
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PIF’s global expansion must be understood within the framework of Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s strategy for economic diversification and international repositioning. Launched in 2016, Vision 2030 aims to reduce the country’s heavy dependence on oil, an industry that has long driven Saudi Arabia’s economic success but is now facing growing pressure as global reliance on oil declines. As many countries shift toward cleaner energy sources and improve fuel efficiency, long-term oil demand has slowed. In response, Saudi Arabia has reduced its daily oil exports, now at around one million barrels per day, in an effort to stabilise global oil prices affected by oversupply.​ This changing energy landscape has pushed the Kingdom to search for new sources of economic growth beyond petroleum. Diversifying away from oil has therefore become a central objective of Vision 2030, with a focus on developing globally competitive sectors such as tourism, culture, entertainment and technology. PIF plays a key role in this process, acting as the main financial engine behind these efforts. Notable investments include the gaming company Savvy Games Group, which completed a full acquisition of market leader EA Electronics in a US$55 billion deal, as well as NEOM, a vast giga-project in northwest Saudi Arabia designed as a semi-autonomous region powered entirely by renewable energy, and evidently, the football industry, in which the PIF has invested around $15 billion since its creation. PIF's presence in domestic football notably gained notice by bringing in Cristiano Ronaldo in the Saudi Pro League, whose pay exceeds $200 million, and by proposing wages for popular football players that exceed $1 billion each.
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Football investments developed alongside spending in sport, tourism, and entertainment as part of a broader strategy to increase Saudi Arabia’s global visibility. Within this wider investment approach, football has become one of the most visible areas because of its global reach and close link to popular culture. As the most watched sport in the world, football offers a powerful platform to reach international audiences, making it especially attractive for a country seeking a stronger position on the global stage.​ From an investment perspective, football falls under the consumer discretionary category, together with tourism and leisure, and currently represents around 3% of PIF’s total asset allocation by industry. By comparison, other sectors that receive far less public attention, such as utilities or communication services, account for a much larger share of the fund’s overall portfolio.​ Despite this, consumer discretionary is a key target area for PIF and is expected to grow in the coming years as part of Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification strategy. With PIF managing close to $1 trillion in assets, consumer discretionary investments already amount to roughly $30 billion, with football estimated to represent between $10 billion and $15 billion of that total. As this category expands, football is likely to grow alongside it, reinforcing Saudi Arabia’s ambition to establish itself as a major force in global football.​
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Taken together, the scale of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in football sets it apart from every other sovereign wealth fund. While other state-backed investors have entered the game, none have committed capital on a comparable level. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund is estimated to have invested between $10 billion and $15 billion in football-related assets, including club ownership, league development, and player acquisitions. By comparison, the Qatar Investment Authority’s flagship football asset, Paris Saint-Germain, is valued at around $4–5 billion, while Abu Dhabi’s football exposure through Mubadala Investment Company and City Football Group is estimated at $6–8 billion. Other significant sovereign wealth funds, such as the ones of Norway or Singapore, either avoid football investments or limit their exposure to passive entertainment sectors. This distinguishes Saudi Arabia's strategy: football is not a one-time or marginal investment, but rather a long-term industry to which the Kingdom has committed more capital than any other state-backed fund, demonstrating a clear ambition to establish itself as a dominant force in the world of football.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
The Financial Impact of State-Backed Ownership
State-backed capital influences financial behavior in football, as the dramatic increase in money flow in clubs following large-scale investments exemplifies changes in the football market, particularly today. In 2008, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a member of the UAE royal family, purchased Manchester City F.C. for more than $300 million. This led to over $1 billion in investment in players and facilities, disrupting the traditional football hierarchy and paving the way for today's era of 'financial doping', where football owners utilize their own money to sign highly skilled players, allowing them to more effectively align their agenda with profitable futures. Since Al Nahyan's takeover, City have won eight Premier Leagues, six League Cups, three FA Cups and one Champions League. However, this is not an instance of a single club dumping heavy amount of money into a club, but rather a phenomenon that has now been going one for almost two decades, since the UAE's royal family member's purchase of City F.C. The influx of state-backed financial capacity has fundamentally changed the economic landscape of football investments, going from simple multi-million dollar player purchases and normal club investment percentage stakes, to recurring hundred million dollars player purchases within a single club and big percentage majority stake investments in clubs.
The widening gap in competitiveness between clubs has resulted in monopole-like systems, in which clubs with smaller resources have no possibility of acquiring outstanding players or investing in their facilities when compared to football giants such as PSG, City, and Real Madrid. One significant advantage that state-backed teams have over traditionally-owned clubs is the opportunity to inject equity without immediate requirement for profitability, removing the "traditional" limits of clubs being required to invest cautiously. This substantial change in how money shapes football today demonstrates the systemic shift that has occurred, and it is not an isolated instance of a large budget football investment.​
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The fundamental shift in today's football investment landscape has a significant impact on smaller clubs and is being felt strongly, particularly in football's top competition, the Premier League. With a combined worth of $30 billion and annual earnings of more than $5 billion, the PL surpasses other major leagues such as La Liga and the Bundesliga. However, the Premier League has a significant imbalance inside its ecosystem, as the top clubs (the Big Six plus state-backed clubs) are structurally feasible, whereas the bottom 14 clubs have transfer debts. With the rest of the teams attempting to compete with the financial giants, they have accumulated increasing transfer debt in order to stay competitive. This has resulted in a financial bubble built on future payments rather than real income.
For instance, this ongoing issue appears to be worsening in the following years, as harsher financial requirements will be implemented in the 26-27 season, making it the most dangerous yet. Smaller clubs will struggle to satisfy financial deadlines. The main cause for this is the implementation of the Squad Cost Ratio (SCR), which limits clubs to spending 85% of their football-related earnings (broadcasting, matchday, and commercial income). The impact on smaller clubs comes from the fact that the cap restricts excessive spending on player wages and transfers, limiting their ability to compete with the top clubs and avoid relegation, introducing the future uncertainty of the greatest potential for regulatory noncompliance or even insolvency of a smaller Premier League member club. While state-backed teams with substantial and steady earnings will gain from increased spending capacity under the same limits, allowing them to maintain strong squads without worry of violating regulations.
The Case for PIF’s Ownership Model​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
Supporters of Public Investment Fund’s ownership model argue that it reflects a long-term, development-focused approach to football investment rather than a pursuit of short-term gains. This logic applies both to its involvement in Newcastle United and to its domestic strategy within the Saudi Pro League. On June 5, 2023, PIF acquired controlling majority stakes in four leading Saudi clubs as part of an effort to raise the profile and competitiveness of the domestic league. The fund announced it had taken a 75% ownership stake in Al Hilal, Al Nassr, Al Ittihad, and Al Ahli, all competing in the top tier of Saudi football. This move formed part of the Sports Clubs Investment and Privatisation Project launched under Vision 2030, with the remaining 25% of each club placed under the control of a non-profit entity. According to the Saudi Ministry of Sport, each club is governed by a seven-member board, five of whom are appointed by PIF. This governance structure reflects a deliberate effort to align club management with national strategic objectives, ensuring coordinated investment and decision-making aimed at boosting the global visibility of Saudi football’s leading clubs. The Saudi fund stated: "The transfer of the four clubs will unleash various commercial opportunities, including investment, partnership, and sponsorships across numerous sports."
Since PIF took control of the Saudi Pro League’s leading clubs in June 2023, under the framework of the Sports Clubs Investment and Privatisation Project, a clear pattern of coordinated, high-profile recruitment has emerged, aimed at rapidly increasing the league’s global visibility. Signings such as Neymar, Karim Benzema, N'Golo Kanté, Riyad Mahrez, and Cristiano Ronaldo (the latest arriving before the formal takeover but as part of the same strategic push) illustrate an investment drive that has approached $1 billion in transfer fees alone, excluding wages. Crucially, these moves were not random. They followed a deliberate timing logic that paired global recognition with recent sporting success. Al Ittihad secured Benzema shortly after his Ballon d’Or win, Al Ahli signed Mahrez following a treble-winning season at Manchester City, and Al Nassr recruited Sadio Mané after his African Cup of Nations triumph. Above all, Ronaldo’s arrival served as the anchor signing that opened global attention and lowered the barrier for subsequent elite recruits. Together, these transfers show how the Saudi Pro League has combined global icons, current elite performers, and prime-age professionals to build legitimacy and credibility on the world football stage.
As expected, the Saudi Pro League’s repeated recruitment of high-profile players has made star signings the dominant theme in online press coverage, accounting for more than half of all reported topics. Yet the attention is not limited to individual names. Around a quarter of online coverage now focuses on match reporting and results, indicating that the league is increasingly assessed on its sporting output rather than reputation alone. This shift reflects a competition that is becoming more credible on the pitch, driven in part by the growing presence of players recruited from Europe’s top leagues, which has raised both the standard and intensity of play. In an already crowded global sports media market, the Saudi Pro League is achieving notable levels of attention, and increasingly does so through the quality and competitiveness of the football itself. As the pie chart illustrates, “star-player focus” and “match coverage and results” together account for roughly three quarters of the league’s main media themes, positioning them as the key drivers of coverage. This helps explain how a league that only began to attract sustained international attention in 2023 has generated close to 9 million social media mentions, surpassing established competitions such as Serie A, Ligue 1, and the Bundesliga.
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​For the league’s central partners, this growth translated into clear commercial returns. During the 2024/25 season, social media platforms generated significant net media value for sponsors, with Instagram alone delivering $9.9 million, followed by $7.7 million from X and $2.1 million from TikTok, marking the campaign as a landmark season for the Saudi Pro League. Analysis of social media activity from the league’s ten most-followed players further underlines this impact. Their posts generated an additional $1.25 million in net media value for central sponsors, with title sponsor ROSHN benefiting directly from 22 player-led posts. As more high-profile players and coaches join the league, and as coordination between the league, clubs, and star players deepens, this sponsor value is likely to increase further in the 2025/26 season.
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A New Model, an Open Question
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Taken together, PIF’s entry into football illustrates how quickly the sport can be reshaped when sovereign-scale capital is deployed with clear strategic intent. From the takeover of Newcastle United to the restructuring of the Saudi Pro League under the Sports Clubs Investment and Privatisation Project, investment has been coordinated rather than isolated. High-profile transfers were not pursued at random, but timed to maximise impact, combining global icons, current elite players, and professionals still in their prime. This approach has raised the sporting level of the league while transforming its global profile in a remarkably short period of time. The effects are measurable. Broadcast coverage has expanded far beyond Saudi Arabia, social media attention now rivals that of Europe’s established leagues, and online press coverage increasingly treats the Saudi Pro League as a serious competition rather than a novelty. While star players continue to drive much of the attention, a growing share of coverage focuses on matches and results, signalling a shift toward sporting credibility. For sponsors and commercial partners, this visibility has translated into tangible returns, reinforcing the argument that the model is not only ambitious but commercially effective.
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Yet these successes also expose deeper tensions within football’s existing structure. State-backed ownership alters financial dynamics, placing pressure on wages, transfers, and competitive balance, while challenging regulatory frameworks originally designed for privately owned clubs operating within tighter financial constraints. Rules such as the Squad Cost Ratio aim to restore stability, but they also risk entrenching inequalities and leave open questions about how sovereign wealth should be treated within the game.
Ultimately, the debate surrounding PIF’s ownership model extends beyond Saudi Arabia. It reflects a broader transformation in football, where ownership models and sources of capital are becoming as decisive as performances on the pitch. The model has demonstrated its ability to generate attention, investment, and growth. What remains unresolved is how football’s institutions adapt. As sovereign wealth becomes a lasting presence in the sport, the central question is no longer whether this approach works, but how the game chooses to govern it.